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Abstract
Recent financial crisis has shown that the prior belief that the active
monetary policy in pursuing price stability may not be sufficient enough
to maintain financial stability as well as macroeconomic stability in an
economy. Introducing a new economic policy, the macroprudential pol-
icy gave space to a complete new sphere of affecting an economy through
a policy maker’s perspective. Constructing a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model, which incorporates a banking sector block, enables
us to study the effects of financial frictions on the real economy. Taking
the case of Slovenia, the simulation results show that taking into ac-
count the interplay between the monetary and macroprudential policies
in a form of financial shocks matter in the economy.
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1 Introduction
The goal of price stability under the monetary policy mandate was seen as
largely complementary with that of the financial stability, but the recent global
financial crisis showed that the sole goal of pursuing price stability does not
ensure the overall macroeconomic stability. In the shadows of a rapid rise
of credit and asset prices the unrecognised distortions led to inefficient com-
positions of output, accompanied by the excessive real estate investments,
excessive consumption and the widening of external imbalances. By the time
the systemic risk materialized, the externalities arising from financial market
imperfections intensified, which were reflected in volatile macroeconomic out-
looks and together with the financial crisis leading to a large drop in outputs
and large-scale financial distresses in majority of countries. The recent finan-
cial crisis consequently prompted policy makers to reflect on the existing policy
frameworks and to think out of new policy instruments to help ensure the fi-
nancial stability. An additional policy was introduced – the macroprudential
policy. As both monetary policy and macroprudential policy measures initially
affect the financial sector, the interaction between the two areas seems to be
inevitable. From this perspective the macroprudential policy and monetary
policy should share some similarities.
The macroprudential policy moderates the pro-cyclicality of the financial
system by influencing assets, liabilities and leverage of financial intermediaries
while the monetary policy aims at price stability through the transmission
channel by influencing the interest rate level or degree of liquidity in the finan-
cial system. As the monetary policy pursuing price stability in the medium
term does not ensure the prevention of undesired developments in the financial
sectors, these negative effects could in turn spill-over into the real economy and
ultimately endanger the price and macroeconomic stability. This is even more
important in the case of a small open economy operating in a monetary union.
From this perspective it is crucial that the corresponding economic policies
target financial stability as well. However, at the current juncture of policies,
the actual experience and knowledge of the functioning of the macroprudential
instruments and their interaction with the monetary policy instruments is still
relatively limited.
This paper adds to the gap of estimating quantitative macroprudential-
monetary policy models, taking into account the case of a Slovenia by taking
the monetary policy parameters as exogenous, thus simulating a small open
economy model operating in a monetary union. Following the works of Ia-
coviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Gerali et al. (2010), Quint and
Rabanal (2014), and Bokan et al. (2018) we construct a DSGE model with
banking sector, making it possible to take into account financial frictions, in-
troduce financial shocks to the model and examine their effects on the real
economy. After the construction of the theoretical framework of the model,
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the calibration and the estimation of the model is needed. Some of the model
parameters, for which the set of observable variables from data do not provide
information to estimate them, are calibrated according to known empirical
facts of the modelled economy and are fixed throughout the estimation pro-
cess. The other parameters are estimated by applying the standard Bayesian
methods.
The results suggest that financial shocks matter in the economy. The dy-
namics of the main real economy variables not only reflect the real economy
contraction and expansion, but show the negative influence of the financial
variables via financial frictions during the financial crisis and their comple-
mentary effect during the good times. Implementing macroprudential policy
measures would therefore have to be carefully planned and implemented as
their effect could easily undermine the efforts of the monetary policy. In the
primer DSGE modelling exercise several exogenous shocks that could simulate
the implementation of macroprudential instruments are presented and stud-
ied. Based on the estimation the persistence parameters of macroprudential
shocks have relatively high values, implying that implementing macropruden-
tial measures could have long-lasting effect that resonate through the economy.
Restrictive macroprudential instruments, such as the implementation of addi-
tional capital buffers and lowering LTV ratios mostly undermine the effects
of expansionary monetary policy, but not to the extent that would annul the
effects of the latter. If restrictive macroprudential instruments undermine ac-
commodative monetary policy, they on the other hand complement restrictive
monetary policy. But not all macroprudential measures are restrictive. The
measure of limiting deposit rates for instance complemented the expansionary
monetary policy stance by additionally lowering banking rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the moti-
vation of the paper, while section 3 offers a quick literature review. Section 4
describes the theoretical structure of the model, while the section 5 offers the
explanation of the calibrated parameters that are key in simulating the model
but at the same time are not of interest in the estimation process. Section
6 presents the estimation results of the model. Lastly, section 7 presents the
concluding remarks.
2 Motivation
Against this backdrop, the aim of the paper is to construct a theoretical model
that could, based on the legal setting of the macroprudential policy, try to as-
sess the possible effects of implementing these macroprudential instruments on
the real economy, since most of the above measures are yet to be actively taken
into effect. From the policy perspective it is important to take into considera-
tion the effects of both, the monetary policy and the macroprudential policy.
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During financial crises the aim of a more accommodative or expansionary mon-
etary policy is to in general lower the interest rates, supply the economy with
sufficient liquidity and consequently positively influence private consumption
and investments in order to restore consumer and business confidence, fix the
impaired transmission mechanism and kick-start inflation and output. But as
we have witnessed in the latest financial crisis only pursuing the primary goal
of inflation close to 2 percent was not sufficient enough to preserve financial
stability at the same time. A new approach was needed in a form of macropru-
dential policy. The primary goal of the macroprudential policy is therefore to
secure financial stability of an economy with different macroprudential instru-
ments. Introduction of these instruments are, however, not without an effect
on the economy, especially in the banking sector. Policy makers have to be
aware of the size of the effects of the macroprudential instruments, and even
more importantly the direction of these effects. Combining the two policies
means careful planning as the policy maker wants to implement such measures
and instrument that complement each other.
In the period before the beginning of the global financial crisis, a combina-
tion of a loose monetary policy alongside loosened regulatory regimes provided
an incentive for excessive credit growth and a housing boom throughout the
world. Based on these issues that have arisen from the onset of the financial
crisis the most recent theoretical work1 was done on identifying the sources of
externalities (e.g. excessive credit growth) in the financial sector. These ex-
ternalities provide a rationale to conduct macroprudential policy and compels
the monetary policy to take into account the financial stability in its mandate.
With respect to current legislation (such as the CRR/CRD IV legislation2)
and macroprudential policy guidelines a legal framework was set-up for the
conduct of macroprudential policy and the supervision of the Slovene banking
system in order to prevent future misalignments and distortions on the finan-
cial market. Additionally a coordination mechanisms with relevant authorities
at the national and EU level have been introduced as well.
Several macroprudential instruments and recommendations were already
legally put in place by Bank of Slovenia, but most of them are still inactive.
The following list is in chronological order:
1. In 2012 ceilings to deposit rates were introduced. The purpose of this
measure was to complement the internal capital adequacy assessment
process and defines a premium on capital requirements for new deposits
1Claessens et al. (2008) and Crowe et al. (2013) show that the combination of credit and
housing boom amplify the business cycle in both directions: the amplitude and duration.
2Capital Requirements Regulation aims to decrease the financial sector distortions and
subsequently reflects the Basel III rules on capital measurement and capital standards. This
EU-wide legislation was introduced into national legislation by all the EU member countries.
3
by the private non-banking sector where the realised deposit interest
rate exceeds the ceiling set by the instrument. It aims to mitigate in-
come risk in the context of an excessive increase in deposit interest rates
by the non-banking sector. It should encourage banks to exercise even
greater caution in the management of levels of deposit interest rates,
which should have a positive impact on lending rates.
2. In 2014 Bank of Slovenia introduced a macroprudential instrument defin-
ing minimum requirements for changes in loans to the non-banking sector
relative to changes in non-banking sector deposits, where the ratio is cal-
culated on changes in stocks before considering impairments GLTDF3.
The GLTDF instrument aims at slowing down the decline in the loan-
to-deposit ratio, stabilizing the banking system funding structure and
mitigating systemic risk.
3. In 2015, the Bank of Slovenia legally introduced a new macroprudential
measure, i.e. a countercyclical capital buffer (CCB). The purpose of the
CCB instrument is to protect the banking system against potential losses
insofar as these are related to an increase in risks in the system as a result
of excessive growth in lending. Currently, the buffer rate is inactive and
has been kept at 0 percent of the total risk exposure amount.
4. A macroprudential measure of a capital buffer for other systemically
important institutions (O-SII) was legally introduced at the same time
as the CCB instrument. It has been inactive and set to 0 percent as well.
5. In 2016 non-binding recommendation measures were implemented, which
set the maximum level of the LTV4 and DSTI5 ratios. These two mea-
sures aim to pursue the intermediate objective of macroprudential policy
of mitigating and preventing excessive credit growth and excessive lever-
age.
3 Literature Review
There is a growing literature implementing financial frictions and later on defin-
ing macroprudential policy in monetary models - namely in dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) allowed financial fric-
tions to affect the real economy via quantities through collateral constraints.
3Gross loans-to-deposits flows. More on the GLTDF instrument in Šuler Štavt (2014).
4Loan-to-value ratio.
5Debt service-to-income ratio.
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They construct a dynamic economy model in which the lender cannot force
borrowers to repay their debts unless the debts are secured. This friction
between credit and assets enables the amplification and spillovers of differ-
ent shocks via new transmission mechanism to other sectors. Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) paper introduces financial frictions that affect the real economy
via price of loans. They developed a mechanism in which the condition of
borrower’s balance sheets is a source of output dynamics by inversely relating
the agency costs of underlying physical investments and borrower’s net worth.
Based on these seminal contributions6, Iacoviello (2005) introduced a housing
sector loan-to-value rule interacting with monetary policy. He finds that col-
lateral constraints improve the response of aggregate demand to housing price
shocks, while nominal debt improves the sluggishness of the response of output
to inflation shocks.
Several papers try to follow the Iacoviello strand of research that would
emphasize the complementary role of the macroprudential policy to the mone-
tary policy by introducing credit and collateral requirements into quantitative
general equilibrium models. Borio and Shim (2007), and N’Diaye (2009) for
instance, show that the monetary policy can be supported by the built-in and
countercyclical stabilizers. Kannan et al. (2009), Angeloni and Faia (2009)
and Angelini et al. (2012) introduce capital ratios as a macroprudential policy
tool into a DSGE model. Many other papers such as Galati and Moessner
(2010), Beau et al. (2014) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) follow the
work already done on financial frictions in DSGE models. Christiano et al.
(2008) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) continue by introducing finan-
cial intermediaries into the models, but only emphasize the demand side of the
economy. Recently, Bokan et al. (2018) upgraded a large scale DSGE model
of Gomes et al. (2012) with the inclusion of the banking sector introduced by
Gerali et al. (2010). They add a stylized banking sector that is characterized
by the supply side of the credit markets and thus extend the existing literature.
The second strand of research focuses on empirical evidence. Blundell-
Wignall and Roulet (2013) for instance explore the macroprudential issues by
determining the determinants of bank systemic risk and the effectiveness of
capital controls. Maddaloni and Peydró (2013) analyse the impact on lending
standards of both policies by using the Bank Lending Survey data. Looking
at the conclusions from the empirical evidence as well as from the theoretical
models cautiousness in giving strong policy advice is appropriate with regards
to the complexity and interdependency of economies and the implementation
of macroprudential instruments and their interaction with monetary policy.
Despite the fruitful start of research on the issue it is still not completely
clear how monetary and macroprudential policies interact. Imperfect func-
6Relevant papers regarding this subject are Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke
et al. (1999), as well.
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tioning macroprudential and monetary policies together with institutional and
other economy constraints could deviate substantially from the frictionless
world in models described thus far. Consequently, the effects of macropru-
dential instruments on financial stability are difficult to quantify and design
a well-targeted macroprudential policy optimally intertwined with monetary
policy (Claessens et al., 2013). Some of the recent work therefore focuses on
modelling macroprudential policy without the interaction of the monetary pol-
icy. Clerc et al. (2015) developed a DSGE model in order to analyse exclusively
the effects of the macroprudential policies. In the so-called 3D model financial
intermediaries allocate their net worth together with funds raised from saving
households across via mortgages and corporate lending. External financing
of all borrowers takes the form of debt and is subject to default risk. These
frictions cause financial amplification and distortions due to deposit insurance.
We follow the first strand of work by constructing a standard DSGE macro-
model of a small open economy with a banking sector where several macro-
prudential instruments can be defined. The banking sector framework follows
the Gerali et al. (2010) model setting operating in a single currency area.
By differencing agents to savers and borrowers in the model it enables us to
create conditions for credit, i.e. to introduce the financial sector which col-
lects deposits from savers and extends credit to borrowers. Credit granted
to borrowers is backed up by the value of housing stock which allows us to
model the role of collateral in the form of the loan-to-value ratio. The aspect
of the macroprudential policy will be further strengthened by the implemen-
tation of instruments influencing the liabilities of the financial sector, acting
as additional capital requirements. On the other hand the monetary policy is
conducted by a central bank that targets a CPI inflation rate and reacts to
deviations in the real GDP growth.
4 The model
The model consists of three types of agents: two types of households, savers
and borrowers; and entrepreneurs. Both types of households consume, work
and invest in housing7. The difference between both types of households comes
with the assumption, that savers are saving assets in a form of one-period de-
posits, while borrowers can only borrow from the banking sector and do not
save (one-period loans). Additionally, the borrowers are facing a borrowing
constraint, which ties the capability of borrowing to the value of housing col-
lateral. Entrepreneurs produce a homogeneous intermediate good by using
capital bought from capital producers and labour, which is supplied by both
types of households. All three types of agents have different discount factor
7Housing supply is fixed as in Gerali et al. (2010) and Bokan (2018).
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that they apply to their future utility. This heterogeneity in discount factors
determines positive financial flows in the equilibrium.
The production side of the economy is defined by labour services that are
differentiated by households through labour unions which set wages in order
to maximize the utility subject to adjustment costs. As entrepreneurs produce
the intermediate goods, the monopolistically competitive retail sector buys
the intermediate goods in a competitive intermediate market, differentiate and
price them subject to nominal rigidities accordingly to Calvo pricing (1983).
There is a capital good producer sector as well. It is intended to derive a market
price for capital, which is used as collateral when entrepreneurs borrow from
the banking sector.
The main focus of the paper is the construction of the banking sector.
Considering the macroprudential measures taken by the Bank of Slovenia the
structure of the banking sector is the following. On one side there is a wholesale
banking sector, which operates under perfect competition. These banks choose
loans and deposits. Retail banking sector operates in a monopolistic compe-
tition. The idea behind the monopolistic competition in the banking sector
is to model the market power and sluggishness of interest rates that banks
have when they charge mark-ups and mark-downs on loan rates and deposits8.
Based on this the degree of market power is simulated by controlling for the
value of elasticities of loan and deposit demands. The lower the elasticities
higher the monopoly power in the banking sector. Secondly, the sluggishness
of the interest rates is resolved by applying the Calvo pricing mechanism.
Retail banks take loans from wholesale bank at a homogeneous interest
rate and then provide differentiated loans to households and entrepreneurs,
thus exploit the market power against their customers with applying mark-ups
to loans and mark-downs to deposits with respect to the official policy rate.
Additionally the retail banks face retail-rate adjustment costs when changes
in financing conditions appear. Due to the financial intermediation based on
differentiated interest-rate setting the transmission mechanism no longer de-
pends on perfect pass-through and effectiveness. These financial imperfections
(mark-ups and mark-downs) rather amplify changes in borrowing and deposit
rates, which make the financial side of the modelled economy more realistic.
Since banks are accumulating bank capital through reinvested profits by tying
their capital-to-assets ratio to the target Basel III capital requirement ratio,
the model offers a study of capital adequacy shocks as well.
8Several studies highlighted and confirmed the existence of market power in the banking
sector by using different methods, but mostly empiric surveys, and the construction of
market-power indexes. We will mention a few: De Bandt and Davis (2000), Berger et al.
(2004), Claessens and Laeven (2004), Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), Fernández de Guevara
(2005), Mandelman (2006), Degryse and Ongena (2008), Řepková (2012), Brissimis et al.
(2014), Delis et al. (2017).
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4.1 Households
There is a continuum of two groups of representative households in the model,
savers and borrowers9. While the savers hold deposits, the borrowers’ con-
sumption is financed by wage income and borrowing.
4.1.1 Savers
The representative saving household maximizes the present value of the ex-
pected utility:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtS
[
εct log
(
CSt (i)− ωSC
S
t−1 (i)
)
+ εht logH
S
t (i)−
NSt (i)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
(1)
where βtS is the discount rate and ε
c
t represents a consumption preference
shock10. Consumption of a saving household, CSt (i), is subject to the habit
formation, ωS. The ε
h
t is an exogenous demand shock in housing. Variable
HSt are the housing services, while N
S
t represents the hours worked by the
household. The parameter ϕ is the disutility of work effort.
A saving household is subject to a budget constraint, depicted in real terms:
CSt (i) +Q
h
t∆H
S
t (i) +D
S
t (i) = W
S
t N
S
t (i) +
(
1 +Rdt−1
) DSt−1 (i)
πt
+ T St (i) (2)
The expenses of the savers are divided between consumption CSt (i), accu-
mulation of housing services at real price Qht and deposits made at D
S
t time t.
The expenses are financed by the wage incomeW St N
S
t (i), gross interest income
on deposits
(
1 +Rdt−1
) DSt−1(i)
πt
in time t − 1 and a lump-sum transfers T St (i)
originating labour unions membership net fee and firms’ and banks’ dividends.
9Gerali et al. (2010) and Bokan et al. (2018) use the notion of patient and impatient
households.
10All the shocks considered in the model with the exception of the monetary policy shock
follow an AR(1) process with i.i.d. normal innovations, generally denoted as εt = (1− ρε) ε+
ρεεt−1+η
ε
t . The parameter ρε is the autoregressive coefficient, the ε is the steady-state value
and ηεt is an i.i.d. zero mean normal random variable with standard deviation equal to σε.
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4.1.2 Borrowers
Analogous to the saving households, a representative borrowing household
maximizes the present value of the expected utility:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtB
[
εct log
(
CBt (i)− ωBC
B
t−1 (i)
)
+ εht logH
B
t (i)−
NBt (i)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
(3)
where βtB is the discount rate and ε
c
t represents a consumption preference
shock. Consumption of a borrowing household, CBt (i), is subject to the habit
formation, ωB. The ε
h
t is an exogenous demand shock in housing. Variable
HBt are the housing services, while N
B
t represents the hours worked by the
household. The parameter ϕ is the disutility of work effort.
In contrast to savers, a borrowing household does not collect deposits. It
has to finance its whole consumption through wage income and borrowing.
The budget constraint of a borrowing household is:
CBt (i)+Q
h
t∆H
B
t (i)+
(
1 +Rhht−1
) BBt−1 (i)
πt
= WBt N
B
t (i)+B
B
t (i)+T
B
t (i) (4)
The expenses side of the budget constraint of a borrowing household in-
cludes consumption CBt (i), housing services Q
h
t∆H
B
t (i) and reimbursement of
previous borrowing
(
1 +Rhht−1
) BBt−1(i)
πt
. The expenses of the borrowing house-
hold are financed by wage income WBt N
B
t (i), new loans B
B
t (i) and net labour
union membership fees TBt (i).
Further on, the borrowing households are facing a borrowing constraint,
as introduced by Iacoviello (2005) and followed by Gerali et al. (2010) and
Bokan et al. (2018). The expected value of their collateralizable housing stock
at period t must be high enough to guarantee lenders of debt repayment:
(
1 +Rhht
)
BBt (i) 6 ε
hh,ltv
t Et
[
Qht+1H
B
t+1 (i) πt+1
]
(5)
where εhh,ltvt stands for stochastic loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for household
mortgages. The assumption is that the LTV ratio variations are modelled as
exogenous stochastic processes and do not depend on individual bank choices.
This characteristic allows to study the effects of credit-supply restrictions on
the real side of the economy. However, there is an issue that can arise from
the latter equation. For the size of the LTV shocks we have to assume that
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they are small enough, so that the borrowing constraint remains binding for
the borrowers in the neighbourhood of the steady state and prevents of savers
becoming borrowers11.
4.1.3 Wage dynamics
Savers and borrowers indexed by n ∈ (S,B)) offer differentiated labour. The
labour supply is sold by unions to perfectly competitive labour aggregating
firms which assembles the labour supply accordingly to a CES aggregator and
sells the homogeneous labour input to entrepreneurs. Based on two types of
households, we assume that there are two unions. Each union sets nominal
wages for its members (saving and borrowing households) by maximizing their
utility subject to a downward sloping demand and quadratic adjustment costs:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtn
(
UCnt (i)
[
W nt (i)
Pt
Nnt −
κw
2
(
W nt (i)
W nt−1 (i)
− πιwt−1π
1−ιw
)2
W nt
Pt
]
−
(Nnt )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
(6)
which is subject to:
Nnt (i) =
(
W nt (i)
W nt
)−εwt
Nnt (7)
ιw is an indexation parameter of lagged and steady-state inflation. Pa-
rameter κw controls/measures for the effect of the quadratic adjustment costs,
while εwt is the wage-elasticity shock. The wage Phillips curve can then be
written as:
κw
(
πw
n
t − π
ιw
t−1π
1−ιw
)
πw
n
t = βnEt
[
λnt+1
λnt
κw
(
πw
n
t − π
ιw
t−1π
1−ιw
)
(
πnt+1
)2
πt+1
]
−(1− εwt )N
n
t +
εwt (N
n
t )
1+ϕ
Wnt λ
n
t
(8)
11This issue is discussed in more detail by Iacoviello (2005) by simulating when does the
collateral constraint bind. The conclusion is that the borrowing constraints might become
looser in an economic upswing. Thus, when the demand increases, the collateral price
increases as well, consequently implying two effects. First, the price effect reduces the
asset demand. And second, the collateral effect drives asset demand up, leading to further
relaxation of the borrowing constraint. If the second effect dominates, the collateral capacity
for each unit of the asset pledged becomes procyclical, rising in good times, and falling in
bad times. This offers potential for more buffer-stock behaviour in good times, and for less
in bad times. If so, borrowing constraints might be less binding in good states of the world.
The asymmetric response of the collateral constraints in confirmed by the Guerrieri and
Iacoviello (2017) paper.
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4.2 Entrepreneurs
In order to model borrowing in the production side as well, there is a continuum
of borrowing entrepreneurs that maximize the utility function, given by:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtent
[
log
(
Centt (i)− ωentC
ent
t−1 (i)
)]
(9)
where Centt (i) represents consumption, and is subject to habit formation, ωent.
An entrepreneur chooses consumption, physical capital, Kentt (i), loans from
banks, Bentt , the degree of capacity utilization, ut, and labour input, N
ent
t .
The decisions of an entrepreneur are therefore subject to a budget constraint:
Centt (i) +W
S
t N
Sd
t (i) +W
B
t N
Bd
t (i) +
(
1 +Rentt−1
) Bentt−1 (i)
πt
+Qkt∆K
ent
t (i) + ψ (ut (i))K
ent
t−1 (i) =
Y entt
Xt
+Bentt (i) +Q
k
t (1− δ)K
ent
t−1 (i)
(10)
where δ is the depreciation rate, Qkt is the price of physical capital in terms of
consumption, while the expression ψ (ut (i))K
ent
t−1 (i) represents the real cost of
setting a level ut of utilization rate.
The relative competitive price of the wholesale good is defined as
P rett
Pt
=
1
Xt
, and is produced by each entrepreneur based on the technology equation:
Y entt (i) = ε
A
t
[
Kentt−1 (i) ut (i)
]α
N entt (i)
1−α (11)
where α is the share of capital utilization in the production function and εAt
is a stochastic process for total factor productivity. The aggregate labour is
defined as N entt =
(
NSdt
)µ (
NBdt
)1−µ
, where µ is the share of savers in total
labour supply.
Banks are willing to lend to entrepreneurs but only against collateral. This
implies that entrepreneurs are constrained by the value of the collateral in the
form of physical capital, which follows the assumption of Gerali et al. (2010).
The borrowing constraint of the entrepreneur is:
(
1 +Rentt
)
Bentt (i) 6 ε
ent,ltv
t Et
[
Qkt+1K
ent
t+1 (i) (1− δ) πt+1
]
(12)
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where εent,ltvt stands for stochastic loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for entrepreneurs
mortgages. As was discussed in the borrowing households section, the assump-
tion for the size of the LTV shocks is that they are small enough, so that the
borrowing constraint remains binding for the borrowers in the neighbourhood
of the steady state.
4.2.1 Capital goods producers and goods retailers
Following Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005), at time
t zero-profit perfectly competitive firms buy last period capital, (1 − δ)Kt−1,
at price P kt from entrepreneurs in the capital goods market. Capital goods
producers are owned by entrepreneurs. At the same time the firms buy an
amount xt of final goods from retailers at price Pt. The purchasing activity in
the capital goods market increases the stock of effective capital, Kt, and at the
end of the period is sold back to entrepreneurs. The last period capital is thus
converted into new capital, while the transformation of the final good is subject
to quadratic adjustment costs. Both constitute a maximization problem for
the capital goods producers:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
Λent0,t
(
qkt ∆Kt − xt
)
(13)
subject to:
Kt = Kt−1

1−
κi
2
(
xtε
qk
t
xt−1
− 1
)2

 xt (14)
The expression ∆Kt = Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1 is the capital flow output. The
parameter κi measures the adjusting cost of investment, while ε
qk
t represents
the productivity shock of investment goods.
In order to provide the price stickiness in the model, the retailers operate
in a monopolistically competitive market. They buy the intermediate good
from entrepreneurs at the price P rett , re-brand and differentiate the good at
no cost. Each retail good firm then sells his differentiated good, applying a
mark-up over the wholesale price P rett . The pricing mechanism of the retailers
follows Calvo (1983) and are indexed to a combination of past and steady-state
inflation, with relative weights parametrized by ιp. The retailers, if they want
to change their price they face a quadratic adjustment cost parametrized by
κp as well. They maximize profits according to the following equation:
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E0
∞
∑
t=0
Λret0,t
[
Pt(j)Yt(j)− P
ret
t Yt(j)−
κp
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt
− π
ιp
t−1π
1−ιp
)2
PtYt
]
(15)
subject to a downward sloping demand from the consumers maximization of
the consumption aggregator:
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−εyt
Yt (16)
where demand faces a stochastic price-elasticity shock εyt .
4.3 Banking sector
The banking sector acts as an intermediary for all financial transactions in
the model, which in turn allows for financial frictions to occur. Consequently,
banks can assert a relatively high loan rate to the borrowing entrepreneurs
and households, and a low deposit rate to the saving households. Banks are
owned by households and follow a balance sheet identity:
Bt = Dt +K
b
t (17)
Banks can finance loans, Bt, by using Dt or bank capital, K
b
t . Banks in
the model serve as a feedback loop between the real and the financial sector
in the economy. The bank capital is accumulated out of retained earnings,
and plays a key role in determining the conditions of credit supply, both for
quantities and for prices. A further assumption is that a representative chooses
optimal capital-to-assets (i.e. leverage) ratio from which it is costly to deviate.
Therefore, as the macroeconomic conditions deteriorate, the profitability of
banks and bank capital might be negatively hit. Banks might respond to
the ensuing weakening of their financial position (i.e. increasing leverage)
by reducing the amount of loans they are willing to extend to the private
sector. The model might thus potentially account for the type of the credit
cycle typically observed in recent recession episodes, with a weakening real
economy, a reduction of bank profits, a weakening of banks’ capital positions
and the ensuing credit restriction.
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4.3.1 Wholesale banking
The wholesale banking sector is modelled under perfect competition. It com-
bines bank capital, Kbt with wholesale deposits, Dt, and loans Bt, as depicted
in equation (17). A wholesale activity cost is related to the capital position of
the bank. The bank pays a quadratic cost (parametrized by a coefficient κbK
and proportional to outstanding bank capital) whenever the capital-to-assets
ratio
Kbt
Bt
moves away from an optimal or target value capb.
Bank capital follows a typical capital dynamics equation:
Kbt = (1− δb)K
b
t−1 + θbΠ
b
t−1 (18)
where Πbt−1 are overall profits of each bank, while (1− θb) captures the dividend
policy of the banks and is exogenously determined. The parameter δb measures
resources used in the managing bank capital.
A wholesale bank chooses loans and deposits so it maximizes a discounted
sum of cash flows and chooses:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
Λ0,t
[
(
1 +Rbt
)
Bt −Bt+1 +Dt+1 −
(
1 +Rdt
)
Dt +∆K
b
t+1 −
κKb
2
(
Kbt
Bt
− capb
)2
Kbt
]
(19)
while the bank’s decision is subject to a balance sheet constraint:
Bt = Dt +K
b
t (20)
The variable Rbt is the net wholesale loan rate and R
d
t is the net wholesale
deposit rate. Both rates are taken as given. By using the balance sheet con-
straint twice (19) the wholesale bank’s maximization problem can be simplified
into:
max
{Bt,Dt}
[
RbtBt −R
d
tDt −
κKb
2
(
Kbt
Bt
− capb
)2
Kbt
]
(21)
The first order conditions of the maximization problems provide a condition
that links the spread between wholesale rates on loans and on deposits to the
degree of leverage:
14
Rbt = R
d
t −
κKb
2
(
Kbt
Bt
− capb
)2(
Kbt
Bt
)2
(22)
Further on, in order to close the model, the assumption is that banks have
access to unlimited finance at the monetary policy rate Rt from a lending
facility at the central bank: hence, Rdt ≡ Rt. Simple algebra of the above
equation yields the following equation for wholesale loan-deposit rate spread:
S
b,W
t = R
b
t −Rt = −
κKb
2
(
Kbt
Bt
− capb
)2(
Kbt
Bt
)2
(23)
The wholesale spread is inversely related to the overall capital-to-assets
ratio of banks, Bt
Kbt
. To put in perspective, when banks’ capital level are low
the leverage increases and margins become wider. The higher the leverage, the
wider the spread between the wholesale loan rate and the monetary policy rate,
the more the banks want to lend, thus increasing profits per unit of capital (or
return on equity). And vice versa.
4.3.2 Retail banking
In order to construct the retail banking sector, the loan and deposit demand
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation framework has to be defined first. The assumption
is that deposits and loans aggregated by households and entrepreneurs are a
composite CES basket of slightly differentiated products each supplied by a
branch of a bank j with elasticities of substitution equal to εdt , ε
hh
t and ε
ent
t .
These elasticities of substitution are stochastic. This choice arises from our
interest in studying how exogenous shocks hitting the banking sector are trans-
mitted to the real economy. εdt , ε
hh
t , ε
ent
t affect the value of the mark-ups and
mark-downs that banks charge when setting interest rates and, consequently,
the value of the spreads between the policy rate and the retail loan (deposit)
rates. Innovations to the loan (deposit) mark-up (mark-down) can thus be
interpreted as innovations to bank spreads arising independently of monetary
policy and we can take account of their effects on the real economy.
The demands for loans to households, loans to entrepreneurs and deposits
at bank j depend on overall volumes and on the interest rates charged by
bank j relative to the average rates in the economy and are given by the loans
functions:
BBt (i) =
(
Rhht (i)
Rhht
)−εhht
BBt (24)
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Bentt (i) =
(
Rentt (i)
Rentt
)−εentt
Bentt (25)
and the deposit function:
DSt (i) =
(
Rdt (i)
Rdt
)−εdt
DSt (26)
The retail banking sector works in a monopolistic competition. On one
side, the retail bank j acquires wholesale loans Bt (j) from the wholesale bank
at rate Rbt , differentiates them at no cost and resells them to households and
entrepreneurs applying two different mark-ups. In order to introduce stickiness
and to study the implication of an imperfect bank pass-through, the assump-
tion is that each retail bank faces quadratic adjustment costs for changing
the rates it charges on loans. These costs are parametrized by κhh and κent
and are proportional to aggregate returns on loans. The retail bank therefore
maximizes:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
Λ0,t[R
hh
t (i)B
B
t (i) +R
ent
t (i)B
ent
t (i)−R
b
tBt (i)
−
κhh
2
(
Rhht (i)
Rhht−1 (i)
− 1
)2
Rhht B
B
t −
κent
2
(
Rentt (i)
Rentt−1 (i)
− 1
)2
Rentt B
ent
t ] (27)
and the condition Bt (j) = B
B
t (j) = B
ent
t (j) holds. After imposing a symmet-
ric equilibrium, the first order condition for households yields:
1− εhht + ε
hh
t
Rbt
Rhht
− κhh
(
Rhht
Rhht−1
− 1
)
Rhht
Rhht−1
+ βSEt
[
λt
λt−1
κhh
(
Rhht+1
Rhht
− 1
)(
Rhht+1
Rhht
)2
BBt+1
BBt
]
= 0 (28)
and for entrepreneurs
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1− εentt + ε
ent
t
Rbt
Rentt
− κent
(
Rentt
Rentt−1
− 1
)
Rentt
Rentt−1
+ βentEt
[
λt
λt−1
κent
(
Rentt+1
Rentt
− 1
)(
Rentt+1
Rentt
)2
Bentt+1
Bentt
]
= 0 (29)
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier for budget constraints of households
and entrepreneurs. Loan rates are set by banks based on current and expected
future values of the wholesale bank rate, which is the relevant marginal cost for
this type of bank and which depends on the monetary policy rate as well as on
the capital position of the bank. The adjustment to changes in the wholesale
rate depends inversely on the intensity of the adjustment costs (as measured
by κhh and κent) and positively on the degree of competition in the bank loans
sector (as measured by the inverse of εhht and ε
ent
t ).
Under perfectly flexible interest rates the equations (28) and (29) is sim-
plified to:
Rhht =
εhht
εhht − 1
Rbt (30)
and
Rentt =
εentt
εentt − 1
Rbt (31)
The interest rates on loans are therefore set as a simple mark-up over
marginal cost. The spread between the loans and the monetary policy rate
under flexible rates is given by:
Shht ≡ R
hh
t −Rt =
εhht
εhht − 1
Swht +
1
εhht − 1
Rt (32)
and
Sentt ≡ R
ent
t −Rt =
εentt
εentt − 1
Swht +
1
εentt − 1
Rt (33)
The intuition behind it is that the spread on retail loans is increasing with
the monetary policy rate, and is proportional to the wholesale spread Swht ,
which is determined by the bank’s capital position. In addition, the degree
of monopolistic competition also plays a role by an increase in market power.
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These relations between the elasticity and the loan spreads allows to interpret
shocks to (εhht and ε
ent
t ), and are modelled as stochastic processes.
On the other side, a deposit bank j collects deposits DSt (j) from saving
households and then uses deposits at the renumeration rate Rt. The maxi-
mization problem of a deposit bank is:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
Λ0,t
[
RtD
S
t (i)−R
d
t (i)Dt (i)−
κd
2
(
Rdt (i)
Rdt−1 (i)
− 1
)2
RdtD
S
t
]
(34)
Quadratic adjustment costs for changing the deposit rate are parametrized
by the coefficient κd and are proportional to aggregate interest paid on deposits.
After imposing a symmetric equilibrium, the first order condition for optimal
deposit interest rate setting is given by:
1− εdt + ε
d
t
Rbt
Rdt
− κd
(
Rdt
Rdt−1
− 1
)
Rdt
Rdt−1
+ βdEt
[
λt
λt−1
κd
(
Rdt+1
Rdt
− 1
)(
Rdt+1
Rdt
)2
DSt+1
DSt
]
= 0 (35)
Again, under perfectly flexible interest rates the equation (28) is simplified
to:
Rdt =
εdt
εdt − 1
Rt (36)
The overall real profits of a bank are the sum of net earnings (intermediation
margins minus other costs) from wholesale banks and the retail banks:
Πbt = R
hh
t B
hh
t +R
ent
t B
ent
t −R
d
tD
S
t −
κKb
2
(
Kbt
Bt
− capb
)2
Kbt −Υ
b
t (37)
where Υbt represents adjustment costs for changing interest rates on loans and
deposits.
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4.4 Monetary Policy
The monetary policy follows a Taylor-type rule:
(1 +Rt) = (1 +R)
1−φr (1 +Rt−1)
̺r
(πt
π
)φπ(1−φr)
(
Yt
Yt−1
)φy(1−φr)
εrt (38)
where φπ and φy are weights assigned to inflation and output stabilization,
respectively. R is the steady-state nominal interest rate, while Yt = γ
entY entt (i)
is the aggregate output and εrt is an i.i.d. shock to monetary policy with normal
distribution and standard deviation σr.
4.5 Market Clearing
In order to close the model market clearing has to occur. In the final goods
market the equilibrium condition is given by the resource constraint:
Yt = Ct +Q
k
t [Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1] + ψ (ut)Kt−1 + δ
bKbt−1 +Υt (39)
where Ct = C
S
t +C
B
t +C
ent
t is aggregate consumption, Kt = γ
entKentt (i) is the
aggregate stock of physical capital, It = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 is investment, and
Kbt is the aggregate bank capital. The variable Υt includes real adjustment
costs for the prices, wages and interest rates.
At the same time an equilibrium in the housing market has to be achieved
as well:
H = γSHSt (i) + γ
BHBt (i) (40)
where H denotes the exogenous fixed housing supply stock, while the param-
eters γS and γB determine the share of household types.
5 Calibration
The key calibrated parameters are set with the intention of suiting the model
as close as possible to the economy characteristics of interest - Slovenia. The
saving household discount factor, βS, is set at 0.9943, which implies a steady-
state interest rate on deposits around 2 percent annually. The discount factors
of the borrowing households, βB, and the entrepreneurs, βent, are set to 0.975.
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These values are set according to the papers of Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello
and Neri (2009), and Gerali et al. (2010). The inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labour supply or the disutility of work effort, ϕ, follows the the Clancy
et al. (2014) paper and is set to 1.0. The steady-state of the LTV ratios
for household and entrepreneur loans are set to 0.74 and 0.56, respectively
(Bank of Slovenia, 2015). The target value of the capital-to-assets ratio (capb)
is set to 0.08, following the Basel III criteria, despite . The depreciation
rate of capital δ is set to a typically set-up value at 0.025. The steady state
elasticity parameter in the labour market εw is set to 5 (implying a 15 percent
wage mark-up), while for the steady state elasticity parameter in the goods
market εp is set to 6 (implying a 20 percent price mark-up). The share of
unconstrained households µ follows the value of 0.8 set by Gerali et al. (2010).
The steady state elasticity parameters εd, εent and εhh are set to -1.3, 3.0
and 3.0, respectively. Since Slovenia is a small open economy, the Taylor rule
parameters are calibrated close Taylor rule parameters in Clancy et al. (2014)
paper for Slovenia. φπ and φy are set to 2.0 and 0.1, respectively. This means
that GDP dynamics of Slovenia does not influence the endogenous setting of
the monetary policy interest rate. On the other side we let the inflation gap
set the monetary policy interest rate, accordingly to the literature with respect
to the modelling of the ECB’s monetary policy.
6 Estimation
Other parameters that were not calibrated, and are of our interest, need to
be estimated. We apply bayesian methodogy techniques by setting up the
prior values of the parameters and observing the actual data. There are 12
observable variables: private consumption, private investment, wages, house
price index, loans to households, loans to entrepreneurs, deposits, eonia index,
interest rate of household borrowing, interest rate of entrepreneurs borrowing,
and the deposit rate. Data is given on a quarterly frequency while the period
expands from 2005Q3 till 2017Q1. They enter the model as deviations from
the steady state.
The results of the prior and posterior distribution of the estimated vari-
ables are shown in Table 1. The estimation process followed the 2.000.000
step Metropolis-Hastings MCMC algorithm with 2 sequential chains and ac-
ceptance rate of 36 percent. The converge diagnostics (Brooks and Gelman,
1998), shocks and the prior and posterior distributions are presented in the
Appendix B. Looking at the estimation results, all the shocks are quite per-
sistent, especially shocks related to banking sector, such as the LTV shocks
(εent,ltv and εhh,ltv), and are in-line with the existing literature. This would
imply that from the policy perspective it is important to take into considera-
tion these ”long-lasting” characteristics of shocks when implementing related
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macroprudential measures and instruments. The interest rate stickiness pa-
rameters (the κs) show that the deposit rate value of the parameter is higher
than for the loan rates meaning that the deposit rate adjust faster to changes
in the official rate of monetary policy rate. These findings could indicate a
bigger competition between banks attracting deposits, or put differently less
market power and/or a more interest rate elastic demand for deposits12. This
could be due to the fact that the sample is relatively short and includes a
strong boom cycle followed by a very strong protracted recession.
12Similar conclusions were made by De Bondt (2002).
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Table 1: Prior and posterior distribution of the estimated variables
Parameter prior posterior 90 % HPD prior prior
and shock mean mean interval distribution std. error
ρεc 0.800 0.6238 0.5139 0.7263 beta 0.1000
ρεh 0.800 0.9958 0.9922 0.9994 beta 0.1000
ρεent,ltv 0.800 0.9910 0.9836 0.9985 beta 0.1000
ρεhh,ltv 0.800 0.9624 0.9341 0.9916 beta 0.1000
ρεd 0.800 0.5515 0.4729 0.6350 beta 0.1000
ρεhh 0.800 0.8983 0.8369 0.9624 beta 0.1000
ρεent 0.800 0.8161 0.7244 0.9113 beta 0.1000
ρεA 0.800 0.7529 0.7225 0.7766 beta 0.1000
ρ
εQ
k 0.800 0.6112 0.4824 0.7388 beta 0.1000
ρεp 0.800 0.9831 0.9716 0.9953 beta 0.1000
ρεw 0.800 0.9787 0.9652 0.9924 beta 0.1000
ρ
εK
b 0.800 0.7465 0.6631 0.8288 beta 0.1000
̺r 0.500 0.8303 0.7983 0.8630 beta 0.1500
κp 50.000 80.9541 53.9801 107.6701 gamma 20.0000
κw 50.000 64.4650 45.5446 84.9286 gamma 20.0000
κi 2.500 9.7119 7.3136 11.8940 gamma 1.0000
κd 10.000 5.4199 3.9014 6.9256 gamma 2.5000
κent 3.000 2.2458 0.5650 3.9713 gamma 2.5000
κhh 6.000 2.0722 1.2860 2.8461 gamma 2.5000
κKb 10.000 5.1816 2.1502 8.3412 gamma 5.0000
ιp 0.500 0.4852 0.2671 0.7213 beta 0.1500
ιw 0.500 0.3352 0.1523 0.5257 beta 0.1500
ωB = ωent = ωS 0.500 0.7729 0.7080 0.8379 beta 0.1000
εc 0.010 0.0491 0.0384 0.0591 inv. gamma 0.0500
εh 0.010 0.0440 0.0268 0.0610 inv. gamma 0.0500
εent,ltv 0.010 0.0189 0.0151 0.0226 inv. gamma 0.0500
εhh,ltv 0.010 0.0139 0.0110 0.0168 inv. gamma 0.0500
εd 0.010 0.5759 0.4913 0.6607 inv. gamma 0.0500
εhh 0.010 0.4205 0.3400 0.5079 inv. gamma 0.0500
εent 0.010 0.9400 0.5662 1.2760 inv. gamma 0.0500
εA 0.010 0.0097 0.0025 0.0187 inv. gamma 0.0500
εQ
k
0.010 0.0362 0.0255 0.0462 inv. gamma 0.0500
εr 0.010 0.0082 0.0063 0.0100 inv. gamma 0.0500
εp 1.000 1.0220 0.9563 1.0956 inv. gamma 0.0500
εw 0.400 1.0022 0.8965 1.1131 inv. gamma 0.0500
εK
b
0.050 0.1559 0.1289 0.1820 inv. gamma 0.0500
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6.1 Impulse responses
This section discusses the results and presents the impulse responses of key
variables on separate exogenous banking sector shocks imposed to the modelled
economy. In applied work namely, it is often of our interest to study the
response of one variable to an exogenous impulse in another variable. Impulse
response describes the evolution of the variable of interest along a specified
time horizon after a shock in a given moment. The impulse responses of the
exogenous shocks in the following figures depict a 50-period horizon.
Following a negative capital shock of 1 p.p. the decline in bank liabilities
leaves banks too leveraged with costs relative to their deviation from capital
requirements (Figure 1). The negative capital shock is additionally amplified
as the model allows for the coefficient on the adjustment costs on the capital-
to-assets ratio, κKb , estimated at 5.1816 to take an effect. Consequently bank
capital decreases more than just 1 p.p. since it is costly for banks to raise new
capital in order to quickly comply with the capital/loans (legal) target. Banks
try to re-balance assets and liabilities by reducing the aggregate volume loans
and increasing the volume of deposits. At the same time they increase the in-
terest rate margin by increasing interest rate on loans and decreasing deposit
interest rate. These adjustments in the banking sector does not go unnoticed
and transmits into the real economy as well. Investments and consumption
decrease, consequently decreasing the aggregate output for 1 p.p.13. Based on
the results of the impulse responses of the negative capital shock it is crucial
to understand, that the increase in capital requirements could invoke similar
effects to the economy, therefore the accuracy of the timing of the implementa-
tion of a capital buffer (e.g. different than 0 percent) is to be established only
in a so-called clear up-cycle period (Langrin and McFarlane, 2014). Otherwise
it could have negative implications in terms of banks’ financial strength and
its perceived confidence or the overall stigma in the banking sector.
13However, at this stage it is still difficult to construct a quantitatively realistic scenario
based on the conflicting indications following hard and survey evidence on realized and latent
bank capital losses and on the tightening of credit standards as discussed by Gerali et al.
(2010).
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Figure 1: Bank capital shock (deviations from steady state in percentage
points)
Further on, another typical macroprudential measure is the ability of macro-
prudential policy to influence the amount of loans given to the economy (in
our case households and entrepreneurs) based on the available collateral value
- the so called LTV ratio. On the contrary to the capital shock, a 1 p.p. pos-
itive LTV ratio shock has a stimulating effect on the economy (see Figures 2
and 3). Output, consumption, investments, inflation and wages rise. As the
collateral (housing) value rises the aggregate loans in the banking sector (can)
increase as well. The increase in loans temporarily decreases the bank capital
ratio forcing banks to collect more deposits from households by raising deposit
rates. Due to the minor inflation increase the loans interest rates follow suit.
However, simply putting ceiling or caps on LTV ratio is not a clear-cut measure
with respect to instrument’s efficiency. Several (micro-founded) studies have
found out that limiting LTV ratios can have important policy implications.
Capping higher LTV ratio loans on one side can reduce bank risk. But on
the other side, a simple cap on LTV ratios may not work well in practice as a
macro-prudential policy measure due to the fact that the LTV ratio can exhibit
counter-cyclicality. Additionally, in some cases too restrictive LTV ratio caps
have prevented higher quality entrepreneurs from borrowing. Findings imply
that a simple, or unconditional cap on LTV ratios might not only be ineffective
in curbing loan amount in boom periods but may also counter-productively
constrain well-performing borrowers (Ono et al., 2013). Consequently, to have
LTV ratio caps implemented as an effective macro-prudential policy measure,
policy makers should be aware that the efficacy of an LTV ratio cap may
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depend crucially on how it is conditioned.
Figure 2: LTV ratio for entrepreneurs’ mortgages shock (deviations from
steady state in percentage points)
Figure 3: LTV ratio for households’ mortgages shock
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The model allows us to study other (banking sector) shocks as well. Fig-
ure 4, 5 and 6 depict impulse responses of key variables to a mark-up on
loans to entrepreneurs and household shocks, and the mark-down shock on
deposit rate. The mark-up shock on entrepreneurial loans increases the in-
terest rates for entrepreneurial loans and consequently decreases the incentive
for entrepreneurial borrowing, thus decreasing their investment. As the vol-
ume of loans decreases, the bank capital relatively increases. The slowdown
in the entrepreneurial production affects the aggregate output which decreases
alongside the household consumption despite a slight decrease in households
loans interest rate due to a fall in inflation rate. The fall in inflation rate
decreases the interest rate of deposits which in turn decreases the volume of
deposits. The reaction of the economy is slightly different in the case of a
mark-up shock on household loans. As the interest rate for household loans
increases the volume of loans falls, which relatively increases the bank capital.
Consequently the interest rate on deposits slightly increases and volume of
deposits decreases. Consumption of saving households increases and pushes
entrepreneurs to invest more, while the consumption of borrowing households
decrease. Output and inflation slightly increase. The deposit mark-down shock
decreases the consumption of households since instantaneous lower volume of
deposits relatively decreases bank capital, making banks to decrease household
loans. In the absence of consumption, output and inflation decrease. Due to
the inflation decrease interest rate for loans decrease. Entrepreneurs take ad-
vantage of lower loan rates, borrow and invest more, but cannot offset the fall
in output.
26
Figure 4: Mark-up on loans to entrepreneurs shock (deviations from steady
state in percentage points)
Figure 5: Mark-up on loans to households shock (deviations from steady state
in percentage points)
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Figure 6: Mark-down on deposit rate shock (deviations from steady state in
percentage points)
Monetary policy shock is implemented in order to study its effect on the
banking sector variables (see Figure 7). As expected the 1 p.p. rise in the
key policy rate increases the bank interest rates, both for loans and deposits.
As loans rate increases it slows down the consumption and investment due to
the decrease in borrowing of households and entrepreneurs. The slowdown in
demand is reflected in a decrease in the aggregate output (ca. 2 p.p. from
the steady state). Inflation slows down for 0.5 p.p. from the steady state,
while wage inflation decreases for 1 p.p. Higher deposit rates, however, cannot
attract more deposits to banks as it cannot offset the fall in aggregate demand
and wages. The increase in lending rates is higher than the deposit rate increase
thus increasing the interest rate margin and providing a bit of compensation
for the loss of loans and deposits volume for banks. Additionally, the loss of
loans volume increases capital. In short, the real side of the economy reacts
substantially to a monetary policy shock14, while the size of interest rate effects
is rather modest and provides a case for the credit channel, not just the interest
rate channel15.
14The magnitude of the real economy reaction to a monetary policy rate setting shock
is not surprising. In Bokan et al. (2018) paper, the euro area economy reacts to 1 p.p.
monetary policy rate increase with a 1.6 p.p. decrease in output.
15Bernanke and Gertler (1995) identified three puzzle related to monetary policy shock
which point to the existence of other channels than interest rate channel.
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Figure 7: Monetary policy shock (deviations from steady state in percentage
points)
6.2 Historical shock decomposition
A more comprehensive story of quantifying financial shocks could be shown
with the historical shock decomposition charts. The observation period of the
main variables spans from 2005Q3 to 2017Q1. In all of the following figures
the acceleration phase of the boom period culminates in large fluctuations of
shocks that affect the variable realization. As the Slovene economy started
to recover from 2013 on, the negative shocks from the burst period more or
less inverted into positive ones. The following Figures 8-12 represent the con-
tribution of shocks on consumption, investment, house price, inflation and
wages. In the boom period till 2008 it is evident that demand, productivity
and financial shocks had driven consumption and investment growth as well
as inflation, house prices and wages. On the other hand the monetary policy
acted restrictively. As the financial crisis began in 2008 negative demand and
technology shocks as well as financial tightening in loans (negative LTV and
loan rate mark-up shocks) contributed in declining investments and low con-
sumption growth in Slovenia. The ECB reacted to the bursting of the bubble
by immediately lowering the monetary policy rate (positive contribution of
the monetary policy shock), which prevented the consumption and investment
to plummet. However, the ECB’s decision of lifting key monetary rate early
in 2011 due to inflation pressures at that time resulted in a contrary effect
to consumption and investment in Slovenia. In the recovery period starting
from 2013 on the credit standards eased, wage growth picked up and technol-
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ogy shocks positively contributed to the rising consumption and investments.
What is rather surprising is that the monetary policy shocks turned to be
negative in the recovery period, suggesting that the ECB’s monetary policy
may not have been accommodative enough16. The negative contribution of the
monetary policy shocks on consumption, investment and the inflation possibly
reflects the limited room for manoeuvring the monetary policy rates during
the recovery period. The existence of an effective lower bound implies that
the decline of inflation expectations that accompanied the decrease of inflation
caused an unwarranted tightening of monetary conditions in the euro area17,
despite the ECB’s implementation of a variety of non-standard measures. One
could argue that asset purchase programmes of the ECB did not have as strong
direct effect on the Slovene economy as on the other, bigger economies with
more developed securities markets, such as Germany, France or Italy. But on
the other hand, the recovery of these bigger economies helped Slovene econ-
omy to recover via increasing foreign demand, while local autonomous factors
non-related to the common monetary policy could have played their role as
well.
Figure 8: Consumption (deviations from steady state)
16A similar pattern is observed by Conti et al. (2017) in the case of the euro area and
Jovičić and Kunovac (2017) in the case of Croatia.
17Some of the unwarranted tightening of the monetary policy stance was observed by the
ECB (2015) too, as this risk rose from the high level and volatility of money market rates
which was mitigated by the ECB’s policy rate cut, the narrowing of the width of the ECB
monetary policy corridor, in trying to restore a symmetric corridor system around the MRO
rate, and the announcement of additional measures in 2014.
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Figure 9: Investment (deviations from steady state)
Figure 10: House prices (deviations from steady state)
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Figure 11: Overall inflation (deviations from steady state)
Figure 12: Wages (deviations from steady state)
From the banking sector perspective (Figures 13-15), it is evident that
financial factors play a significant role in driving the bank rates alongside the
macro condition of the Slovene economy. In the overheating period alongside
the restrictive monetary policy shocks, high demand and productivity drove up
the deposit and loan interest rates. As the financial crisis began, as expected,
the decrease in the monetary policy rate significantly decreased the banking
rates. Negative productivity and negative mark-down and mark-up shocks in
the loans and deposit rates additionally decreased the banking rates as the
financial crisis lingered on. During the recovering period the low inflation
and contributed that banking interest rates decreased even further. As was
discussed above, the limited room for manoeuvre of monetary policy rates and
the consequent unwarranted tightening of monetary conditions in the euro
area due to effective lower bound prevented the banking rates to additionally
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decline. Based on these findings shocks that could simulate the implementation
of the macroprudential measures (higher capital requirements, and the LTV
ratio caps) can therefore have significant effects on the loans rate dynamics.
Figure 13: Deposit rate (deviations from steady state)
Figure 14: Households’ loans rate (deviations from steady state)
33
Figure 15: Entrepreneurs’ loans rate (deviations from steady state)
Despite the fact that the monetary policy has significant effect on the econ-
omy, the ECB’s monetary policy is exogenous for the Slovene economy. Said
that it cannot prevent distortions of the credit cycle by itself. By having
macroprudential policy available at the national level, the policy makers can
act counter-cyclically.
We find that:
1. LTV measures can be an effective instrument that can affect any sectoral
issues regarding excessive credit growth. That is, these measures can be
used to target directly firm or household borrowing, depending on which
LTV ratio is changed by the macroprudential authority.
2. Capital increases (such as capital buffers or O-SII measures) have a more
general effect, as they affect all sectors. Therefore, if the macroprudential
authority believes that the issue is a more general expansion in economic
activity that is driven by excessive credit expansion, lender-based mea-
sures such as counter-cyclical capital buffer could be used. If the macro-
prudential authority believes that the issue of excessive credit growth is
sector-specific, then borrower-based measures seem to be more effective.
7 Conclusions
The belief that the active monetary policy in pursuing price stability is suf-
ficient enough to maintain financial stability as well as the macroeconomic
stability was put to a great challenge during the last financial crisis. Rapid
rise of credit and asset prices led to inefficient compositions of output, which
was accompanied by excessive real estate investments, excessive consumption
34
and the widening of external imbalances of economies all around the globe. As
the systemic risk materialized, the externalities arising from financial market
imperfections intensified, reflecting volatile macroeconomic outlooks. Together
with the financial crisis lead to a large drop in outputs and large-scale financial
distresses in majority of countries. It consequently prompted policy makers
to reflect on the existing policy frameworks and to think out of new policy
instruments to help ensure the financial stability. Introducing a new economic
policy, the macroprudential policy gave space to a complete new sphere of
affecting an economy through a policy maker’s perspective. Constructing a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, which incorporates a banking
sector block, enables us to study some of the effects of different macropruden-
tial policy measures.
This paper adds to the gap of estimating macroprudential-monetary pol-
icy models, taking the case of Slovenia. The model is estimated on data for
Slovenia over the period 2005Q3-2017Q1 based on Bayesian inference method-
ology. The simulation results show that taking macroprudential policy mea-
sures would matter in the economy. Raising additional capital for banks can be
costly especially if they find themselves below the binding steady state capital-
to-assets ratio. By re-balancing assets and liabilities (volume and price-wise)
banks can significantly affect the real economy. Entrepreneurs down-size their
investments while households cut down their consumption. Loosening the
credit standards (loose LTV ratios) on the other hand can have stimulating
effects on the economy, but could undermine banks’ risk resistance. Following
a monetary policy shock, the real side of the economy reacts substantially,
while the size of interest rate effects is rather modest. Future work should
investigate more into division of two economies operating in a monetary union
and adding alternative banking sector shocks and possibly provide the spillover
effects between countries.
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A Calibrated parameters
Table 2: Calibrated parameters
Parameter value
βS Saving households’ discount factor 0.9943
βB Borrowing households’ discount factor 0.9750
βent Entrepreneurs’ discount factor 0.9750
ϕ Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 1.0
α Capital share in the production function 0.25
δ Depreciation rate of physical capital 0.025
µ Share of unconstrained households 0.8
capb Capital adequacy ratio 0.08
εhh,ltv Households’ LTV ratio 0.74
εent,ltv Entrepreneurs’ LTV ratio 0.56
εh Steady state weight of housing in the hh’s utility f. 0.2
εw Steady state elasticity parameter in the labour market 5.0
εp Steady state elasticity parameter in the goods market 6.0
εd Steady state mark-down on deposit rate -1.3
εhh Steady state mark-up on loans to households 3.0
εent Steady state mark-up on loans to entrepreneurs 3.0
φπ Inflation stabilization weight in the Taylor rule 2.0
φy Output stabilization weight in the Taylor rule 0.1
B Priors and posteriors
Figure 16: Priors and posteriors of the estimated parameters
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